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ABSTRACT Device-to-device (D2D) communication is a recently emerged disruptive technology for
enhancing the performance of current cellular systems. To successfully implement D2D communications
underlaying cellular networks, resource allocation to D2D links is a critical issue, which is far from trivial
due to the mutual interference between D2D users and cellular users. Most of the existing resource allocation
research for D2D communications has primarily focused on the intracell scenario while leaving the intercell
settings not considered. In this paper, we investigate the resource allocation issue for intercell scenarios
where a D2D link is located in the overlapping area of two neighboring cells. Furthermore, we present three
intercell D2D scenarios regarding the resource allocation problem. To address the problem, we develop a
repeated gamemodel under these scenarios. Distinct from existing works, we characterize the communication
infrastructure, namely, base stations, as players competing resource allocation quota from D2D demand,
and we define the utility of each player as the payoff from both cellular and D2D communications using
radio resources. We also propose a resource allocation algorithm and protocol based on the Nash equilibrium
derivations. Numerical results indicate that the developed model not only significantly enhances the system
performance, including sum rate and sum rate gain, but also shed lights on resource configurations for intercell
D2D scenarios.
INDEX TERMS Device-to-device (D2D), resource allocation, intercell, repeated game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Last years have witnessed the advancement of cellular
communication systems, which reshapes the way peo-
ple interact [1], [2]. As current cellular infrastructures
evolve toward Long Term Evolution (LTE), Device-to-
Device (D2D) communication is emerged as a disruptive
innovation to significantly improve the performance of cellu-
lar systems [3], [4], [5]. D2D enables devices of proximity to
communicate with each other directly, thus mitigating the
system overhead, increasing the spectrum utilization, and
improving the cellular coverage [6]. Due to these gains,
D2D has been attracting considerable interests from both
academia and industries recently. For instance, the Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [7], LTE as well as
LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) [8] projects consider to employ
D2D as the potential solution for supporting growing
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communication demands. Therefore, D2D technology plays a
crucial role in improving the performance of cellular system,
and it is expected to be an indispensable technology in the
next generation wireless communication systems [9].
D2D communication sharing cellular spectrum raises a
great challenge to the co-existing of D2D and cellular com-
munication due to mutual interference. In most of the existing
works in D2D communications, they focus on the scenario
where D2D communications operate in the same cell with the
cellular communication, and thus the former only poses inter-
ference to the later located in the same cell. This is commonly
referred to intracell interference. However, in practice, D2D
pairs may reuse common resources of multiple neighboring
cells. Consequently, when such D2D pairs communication
with each other, it will produce interferences to cellular com-
munications in multiple cells. This is referred to as intercell
interference and has been largely ignored in literature. In an
intercell scenario, intercell interference, which needs to be
coordinated among multiple cells and among the cellular and
the D2D user equipment (UE), is more challenging to support
D2D communications [10] and deserve in-depth investiga-
tions. In this paper, we particularly study the intercell sce-
nario and notice that the intercell interference situations can
be different and more severe due to the presence of D2D,
for instance, when the D2D link utilizes downlink cellular
resources, a D2D transmitter may cause strong interference to
a cellular UE in the neighbor cell receiving downlink traffic
using the same resource. Likewise, when a D2D pair utilizes
uplink resources, the D2D receiver may suffer high inter-
ference from a cellular UE in the neighbor cell transmitting
uplink traffic to its serving BS.
To address the interference between cellular and D2D
users, there have been many radio resource management
schemes proposed to manage the interference between cel-
lular and D2D users, which can be generally classified into
four categories: resource allocation [11], [12], power con-
trol [13], [14], model selection [15], [16], and pairing [17].
Among these schemes, resource allocation is the initial step
toward efficient interference coordination. However, previous
studies on resource allocation mainly focused on the intracell
scenario while leaving the intercell settings untouched, and
thus they cannot comprehensively reflect behaviors and per-
formance at the level of entire cellular system.
In the existing D2D resource allocation solutions, game
theory is widely applied to characterize the interactions
and competitions among D2D communications. Game
theory offers a mathematical basis for the analysis of inter-
active decision making processes, which provides tools for
predicting what might (and possibly what should) happen
when rational players with conflicting interests interact [18].
Typically, D2D pairs in previous works are modeled as
players competing for the resources, where the utility of each
player is defined as the function of achievable data rate and
generated interference. Based on the utility function, the equi-
librium, i.e., the optimal resource allocations, can be obtained
through analyzing the player’s best reaction function.
From an interference perspective, these above mentioned
approaches can be extended to handle the intercell case by
simply incorporating interference from another cells. How-
ever, they fail to determine the resource configuration when
D2D exploits the commonly shared spectrum of two neigh-
boring cells. Taking a practical case as an example, when
the user equipments, named UE1 and UE2, are proximal but
scattered in the overlapping area of two neighboring cells.
UE1 and UE2 should be capable of establishing a direct
link as long as they are using the common spectrum of two
cells. Hence, the game model must be redesigned to facilitate
this case.
To fill the gap, this paper investigates the resource alloca-
tion problem for intercell D2D communications underlaying
cellular networks. Unlike previous approaches, we consider
the situations that D2D link is located in the overlapping
region of two neighboring cells. To the best of our knowledge,
this work is an early attempt to address the resource allocation
problem for a D2D link locating in the common area of two
cells. The contributions made in this paper are summarized
as follows.
• We present three intercell D2D communication scenar-
ios with cellular infrastructures: 1) the cellular links in
both cells use uplink resources; 2) the cellular link in
one cell uses downlink resources while that in another
cell uses uplink resources; and 3) the cellular links in
both cells use downlink resources. For each dedicated
scenario, we define the sum rates of BSs and formulate
the resource allocation problem.
• We develop a static Cournot game to address the prob-
lem, which is inspired by [19] that aims primarily at
the secondary users competing for the spectrum shared
by the primary user in cognitive radio networks. Unlike
existing works that modeled the D2D pairs as players,
this static game characterizes the BSs as players compet-
ing for resource quota of D2D demand, and defines the
utility of each player as the payoff collected from both
cellular and D2D communications using the resources.
With this game, we then analyze its Nash Equilib-
rium/Equilibria (NE) properties and propose a repeated
version. By enabling the static game to repeat, the pay-
offs of BSs can be improved, and thus the repeated
model is more preferable for the considered scenarios
than the static one.
• We propose a resource allocation algorithm and a pro-
tocol according to the NE derivation and analysis. The
protocol determines the communication scenario and
guides the BSs to allocate resources to D2D link. If the
NE of the game exists, the resource allocation as NE is;
otherwise, the resource allocation from each BS is the
half of D2D resource demand.
• We examine the sensitivity factors of the model and
system performance through extensive numerical exper-
iments. The results verify that the model developed in
this paper considerably improve the system performance
in terms of sum rate and sum rate gain, which further
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provides a systematic insight on resource allocation for
intercell scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 presents
the system model including three D2D communication sce-
narios. In Section 4, we develop a repeated game and analyze
the equilibrium to address the resource allocation problem.
A resource allocation algorithm and a protocol on the basis of
equilibrium analysis is also proposed in this section. Section 5
presents the numerical results and we conclude the paper
in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Resource allocation for D2D communication is a critical
issue that deserves a thorough consideration in order to coor-
dinate the interference efficiently. Various works have been
proposed to address this issue, most of which formulated
the problem from an optimization perspective: they share the
same objective in mitigating the interference while improving
the Quality-of-Service (QoS) performance of the system.
The joint resource allocation schemes with resource
reuse, model selection, and power control were proposed
in [16], [20], and [21], respectively. In [22], authors consid-
ered to maximize the spatial reuse of radio resources and
proposed a suboptimal greedy algorithm. A Partial Time-
frequency Resource Allocation (PRA) framework for D2D
communications was provided by [23]. [24] presented an
algorithm that restricted the mutual interference under the
constraints by adopting the interference limited area control
method. A two-phase solution approachwas proposed in [25],
where resource allocation for cellular flows with max-min
fairness was performed in the first phase and resource alloca-
tion for D2D flows was conducted in the second phase. [26]
provided a resource allocation method that D2D can reuse
the resources of more than one cellular user. Authors in [27]
considered a scenario of D2D communications overlaying
a cellular network and proposed a spectrum sharing proto-
col. The protocol allowed the D2D users to communicate
bi-directionally with each other while assisting the two-way
communications between the cellular base station and the
cellular user.
Recently leveraging game theory to allocateD2D resources
has become an active research topic since the game the-
ory can provide an insightful understanding to the complex
interactions among independent rational players. The game
model for D2D resource allocation can be generally classi-
fied into two categories: non-cooperative and cooperative.
In the former type, D2D UEs are commonly viewed as
players competing for the resources. [28]–[31] addressed
the D2D resource allocation using auction games. In par-
ticular, [28] took the energy efficiency into the optimization
objective account. [29] presented a sequential second price
auction where all the spectrum resources were considered
as a set of resource units auctioned off by groups of D2D
pairs in sequence. A non-monotonic descending price auction
algorithm was presented by [30]. The utility function in this
game factored the channel gain from D2D and the costs for
the system. In [17], authors developed a Stackelberg game,
in which a cellular UE and a D2D UE to form a leader-
follower pair. Then a joint scheduling and resource allocation
scheme to improve the performance of D2D communication
was proposed.
In addition to the above non-cooperative games, coopera-
tive game for D2D resource allocation has also been explored.
In [32], a coalitional game with transferable utility is devel-
oped. In this game, each D2D user attempts to maximize its
own utility and has the incentive to cooperate with other users
to form a strengthened user group. As such, user can increase
the opportunity to win its preferred spectrum resources.
Our work differs aforementioned works from follow-
ing aspects. First, all of these works investigated the
D2D resource allocation in a single cell, while we design a
game to formulate the intercell scenarios where the D2D link
is located in the common area of two neighboring cells. Sec-
ond, unlike the above works that characterized the D2D users
to be players as usual, we model the BSs as players instead.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider the scenario that two D2D users are located in
the overlapping area of two neighboring cells using uplink
resources for communications. In each cell, there is a cellular
user that is communicating with the base station. We assume
that the D2D pair reuses the uplink resources with cellular
users while cellular communications utilize either uplink
or downlink resources, thus they are able to work with
coordination from BSs. The scenario can be formulated as
three cases illustrated in Fig. 1, where UE3 (transmitter) and
UE4 (receiver) are the D2D pair, UE1 and UE2 are cellular
users.
• Case 1:Cellular communications (dark arrowed lines) in
both cells use uplink resources. In this case, the D2D pair
(blue arrowed dot line) causes interference (red arrowed
dot line) to both BSs as shown in Fig. 1(a).
• Case 2:Cellular communications in the left hand cell use
downlink resources, while those in the right hand cell
use uplink resource. D2D communications only cause
interference to BS2 in this context as shown in Fig. 1(b).
• Case 3: Cellular communications in both cells use
downlink resources, where D2D pair causes no interfer-
ence to any BS as shown in Fig. 1(c).
We define the sum rate of BS for above three cases. Let
Gij be the channel power gain between the transmitter i and
the receiver j over either the cellular link or the D2D link,
G3BS1 be the gain between UE3 and BS1, G3BS2 be the gain
between UE3 and BS2. Denoting the power of transmit-
ter i by pi, the sum rate of m-th BS in Case n by Rnm, the
noise power of additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) at the
receiver by N0. Consequently, for Case 1, it yields
R11 = B1 · log2
(
1+ G1BS1p1
N0 + G3BS1p3
)
, (1)
R12 = B2 · log2
(
1+ G2BS2p2
N0 + G3BS2p3
)
. (2)
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FIGURE 1. D2D communications across two neighboring cellular
networks. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
where B1 and B2 are the bandwidth of BS1 and BS2,
respectively.
Similarly, for Case 2, we have
R21 = B1 · log2
(
1+ GBS11pBS1
N0
)
, (3)
R22 = B2 · log2
(
1+ G2BS2p2
N0 + G3BS2p3
)
. (4)
For Case 3, we have
R31 = B1 · log2
(
1+ GBS11pBS1
N0
)
, (5)
R32 = B2 · log2
(
1+ GBS22pBS2
N0
)
. (6)
The sum rates of both BSs allow us to obtain their payoffs
collected from cellular communications. Note that the inter-
ference incurred by the D2D link has been taken into the
sum rate account, which is a key parameter impacting the
total payoff of the BS. Essentially the more resources, for
example bandwidth (or physical resource block in LTE-A),
allocated to the D2D, the lower interference it generates.
Hence resource should be carefully allocated to D2D. In the
following, we apply game theory to determine the amount
of resources that should be allocated to D2D transmitter by
each BS. We assume that the channel state information (CSI)
of all involved links in each cell is available to the correspond-
ing BS so that both BSs are capable of coordinating the radio
resources.
IV. REPEATED GAME THEORETIC
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
As a D2D link reuses the common resources across two
cells, each operator can charge the D2D UE fees, and thus
operators have incentive to allocate resources to D2D users
for maximizing their payoffs. The competition among both
operators for resource allocation can be formulated as a non-
cooperative game, in which BSs are modeled as players.
In this section, we first present a static game model with an
assumption that each BS can completely observe the strate-
gies and payoffs of the other BS, and then we extend this
model to a repeated version. Note that the game repetition
times are set finite so that the D2D pair can obtain the
resource for data transmission immediately.
A. STATIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME
We define the utility of a player as the monetary revenue
that consists of two parts. The first part comes from the fees
collected from cellular users, and the second part is the fees
charged from D2D communications. The utility function of
players are defined as
Un1 = α · Rn1 + β · Bδ3 − γ · Bδ3, (7)
Un2 = α · Rn2 + β · Bθ3 − γ · Bθ3, (8)
where α and β are constants denoting the charging price
of unite data rate and resource, respectively. γ is the
cost function of resource, Bδ3 and B
θ
3 are the allocated
bandwidth (resources) from BS1 and BS2.
With respect to γ , a pricing function from [19] is
employed, thus it can be expressed as
γ = x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ , (9)
where x, y, τ are non-negative constants, and τ ≥ 1 guaran-
tees that the cost function is convex.
Eq. (9) implies that the cost of both BSs are essentially
relevant to the resources obtained by D2D. When a BS, say
BS2, unilaterally increases the allocations to maximize its
utility, the cost of both BSs would be raised accordingly.
This would further lead to the decrease of BS1’s utility, and
thus BS1 has incentive to allocate more resources competing
with BS2.
Since there is a trade-off between power and band-
width [33], we have
p3 ∝
1
Bδ3 + Bθ3
, (13)
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
∂U11 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bδ3
= α · B1 · G1BS1p1(z1+G1BS1p1·Bδ3) ln 2 + β − [x + y(B
δ
3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bδ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
∂U12 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bθ3
= α · B2 · G2BS2p2(z2+G2BS2p2·Bθ3) ln 2 + β − [x + y(B
δ
3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bθ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2
Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax.
(10)

∂U11 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bδ3
= β − [x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bδ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
∂U12 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bθ3
= α · B2 · G2BS2p2(z2+G2BS2p2·Bθ3) ln 2 + β − [x + y(B
δ
3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bθ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2
Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax.
(11)

∂U11 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bδ3
= β − [x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bδ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
∂U12 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bθ3
= β − [x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ ]− Bθ3[y · τ (Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ−1] = 0
0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2
Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax.
(12)
without loss of generality, we assume
[N0 + G3BS1p3] =
z1
Bδ3
, [N0 + G3BS2p3] =
z2
Bθ3
, (14)
where z1 and z2 are non-negative constants, then
Un1 = α · Rn1 + β · Bδ3 − [x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ ] · Bδ3, (15)
Un2 = α · Rn2 + β · Bθ3 − [x + y(Bδ3 + Bθ3)τ ] · Bθ3. (16)
The optimization problem of resource allocation for inter-
cell D2D communication can be formulated as
max Unm(B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
s.t. Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax, 0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1,
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2,
α, β, x, y > 0,
z1, z2 ≥ 0,
τ ≥ 1. (17)
where Bmin and Bmax are the minimum and maximum
resource demand of D2D pair.
Note that Bmin is used to implicitly restrict the
D2D’s transmission power that does not cause harmful inter-
ferences to both BSs and cellular users. On the other hand,
since the D2D link reuses the common resources of two
cells, the bandwidth allocated to D2D by each BS should
not exceed to the bandwidth allocated to the corresponding
cellular user in each cell, therefore, we have 0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1
and 0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2.
According to the definition of NE, it can be obtained
by solving the best response function of each player,
that is
(Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3) = argmaxUnm(Bδ3,Bθ3)
s.t. Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax, 0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1,
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2,
α, β, x, y > 0,
z1, z2 ≥ 0,
τ ≥ 1. (18)
To obtain the NE of the above static game, we dif-
ferentiate Unm with respect to B
δ
3 and B
θ
3 , respectively.
Therefore 
∂Un1 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bδ3
= 0
∂Un2 (B
δ
3,B
θ
3)
∂Bθ3
= 0
0 ≤ Bδ3 ≤ B1
0 ≤ Bθ3 ≤ B2
Bmin ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ Bmax.
(19)
For each communication case, the NE can be obtained
through solving (10), (11), and (12), respectively.
B. REPEATED RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME
Prior to delving into the design of repeated resource alloca-
tion game, let us analyze the NE property for both players
in above static game first. Fig. 2 describes the illustrative
NE properties of static game, where the red and blue line rep-
resent the best response function of BS1 and BS2, the black
lines are the D2D resource demand constraints, and the gray
area, formed by black lines and coordinate axes, is the feasible
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strategy space of players. Fig. 2(a), Fig. 2(b), and Fig. 2(c)
show the intersections of blue and red lines locate inside
and outside of gray area, which correspond to the cases that
the NE exists (Fig. 2(a)) and does not exist (Fig. 2(b), (c)),
respectively. It is obvious to observe from Fig. 2(a) that the
solution of the static game, i.e., the intersection of blue and
red lines, could be improved by increasing both Bδ3 and B
θ
3
iteratively while keeping the NE within the gray area. In an
extreme case, the solution is able to be refined intersecting
at the boundary of gray area, namely the upper black line.
Moreover, as Fig. 2(c) indicated, one can expect that the
game repetitionmay enable the NE feasible. Inspired by these
observations, we develop a repeated resource allocation game
model in the following.
Since the BSs are rational players, they can adjust the
resource allocations to maximize their payoffs. The adjust-
ment of each player can be expressed as
Bδ3(t + 1) = (1+ t · a1) · Bδ3(t), (20)
Bθ3(t + 1) = (1+ t · a2) · Bθ3(t). (21)
where Bδ3(t + 1) and Bθ3(t + 1) are the allocated resources
at (t + 1)-th round, a1 and a2 are the adjustment parameters
of BS1 and BS2.
With above equations, the repeated game for resource allo-
cation can be modeled as
max Unm(B
δ
3(t),B
θ
3(t))
s.t Bmin ≤ Bδ3(t)+ Bθ3(t) ≤ Bmax, 0 ≤ Bδ3(t) ≤ B1,
0 ≤ Bθ3(t) ≤ B2,
α, β, t, x, y > 0,
z1, z2 ≥ 0,
τ ≥ 1. (22)
Note that the iterations of game are limited. This is due
to the fact that a D2D pair in practical cellular networks has
to obtain the resource for communication immediately. To a
finite repeated game, the NE can be obtained as long as it
exists.
C. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROTOCOL
A resource allocation protocol is designed based on the
resource allocation algorithm,which is shown inAlgorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Resource Allocation Algorithm
Input: N0,Gij, x, y, z1, z2, τ, α, β,Bmax, tmax, a1, a2.
Output: Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3 .
Determine the communication scenario and initialize the1
corresponding Rn1 and R
n
2 where n ∈ {1, 2, 3};
t ← 1;2
while t ≤ tmax do3
Calculate Un1 (B
δ
3(t),B
θ
3(t)) and U
n
2 (B
δ
3(t),B
θ
3(t)) in4
terms of (11) and (12);
Calculate Bδ3(t),B
θ
3(t) by solving one of (16), (17),5
and (18);
if Bδ3(t)+ Bθ3(t) > Bmax then6
if t = 1 then7
Bˆδ3← Bmax2 , Bˆθ3 ← Bmax2 ;8
return Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3;9
else10
Bˆδ3← Bδ3(t − 1), Bˆθ3 ← Bθ3(t − 1);11
return Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3;12
end13
end14
if t = tmax then15
if Bδ3(t)+ Bθ3(t) < Bmin then16
Bˆδ3← Bmin2 , Bˆθ3 ← Bmin2 ;17
return Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3;18
else19
Bˆδ3← Bδ3(t), Bˆθ3 ← Bθ3(t);20
return Bˆδ3, Bˆ
θ
3;21
end22
else23
Bδ3(t + 1) = (1+ t · a1) · Bδ3(t);24
Bθ3(t + 1) = (1+ t · a2) · Bθ3(t);25
t ← t + 1;26
end27
end28
In this algorithm, the communication scenario in line 1 refers
to three cases that we defined in Fig. 1. After the scenario is
determined, the algorithm steps into the game: the while-loop
FIGURE 2. NE analysis for static resource allocation game. (a) NE exists. (b) NE not exists. (c) NE not exists.
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as indicated from line 3 to line 28. The game will be played
repeatedly by updating Bδ3(t) and B
θ
3(t) (line 24, 25) in the
case that any termination condition is not satisfied. More
specifically, if Bδ3(1) + Bθ3(1) > Bmax in the first stage, the
NE does not exist, that is, the case illustrated in Fig. 2(b),
the algorithm exits with Bˆδ3 = Bˆθ3 = Bmax2 as indicated from
line 7 to line 9. If Bδ3(t) + Bθ3(t) > Bmax during the
game repeating, the game is terminated immediately with
Bˆδ3 = Bδ3(t − 1) and Bˆθ3 = Bθ3(t − 1) as described from
line 10 to line 12. Also, if t = tmax and Bδ3(t)+Bθ3(t) < Bmin,
the NE does not exist, that is, the case illustrated in Fig. 2(c),
the algorithm exits with Bˆδ3 = Bˆθ3 = Bmin2 as indicated from
line 16 to line 18. If t = tmax andBmin ≤ Bδ3(t)+Bθ3(t) ≤ Bmax
the game is stopped with Bˆδ3 = Bδ3(t) and Bˆθ3 = Bθ3(t) as
described from line 19 to 21.
Note that the resource allocations are unpredictable when
NE does not exist. In response, the proposed resource alloca-
tion quotas from both BSs are all set to be Bmax2 or
Bmin
2 ; thus
ensuring the fairness of the stations. The term fairness here
refers to the amount of resources obtained by D2D from each
BS is identical. Based on Algorithm 1, we present a resource
allocation protocol, which gives the details howBSs andD2D
pair should respond to each case.
In the protocol, the actions of BS consist of three major
steps. First, each BS exchanges the parameter information
(including all of input parameters in Algorithm 1) with
another BS as well as D2D pair through a messaging mech-
anism at the beginning of resource allocation [34]. That is,
the messaging mechanism makes all the information pub-
licly available, and thus the utility functions of all players
are the common knowledge. Second, the BSs cooperate to
determine the communication scenario, from which the BSs
initialize the corresponding sum rate Rn1, R
n
2, and t . Since
each BS knows the utility function of another, it can pre-
dict the strategy of its opponent play. Therefore, both BSs
simultaneously submit their resource assignment proposals,
i.e., Bδ3(t) and B
θ
3(t), to D2D.
After receiving the resource assignment proposals,
D2D pair would examine whether the game is terminated
or not. In the first round, if the sum of resource assignment
proposals from both BSs does not exceed the maximum
constraint (Bmax), BSs continue to play the game by updat-
ing Bδ3(t) and B
θ
3(t); otherwise D2D pair notifies both BSs
with requested resources Bmax2 , and D2D eventually obtains
Bmax resources in total for transmission. During the game
repetition, if the sum of current proposals, i.e. Bδ3(t) + Bθ3(t)
is beyond the constraint, D2D would send a message to
both BSs that the game is terminated and inform them the
requested resources are the submitted proposals of previous
stage, i.e., Bδ3(t − 1) and Bθ3(t − 1). If the above two cases did
not occur, D2D pair would check if the current proposals are
satisfied the minimum constraint, i.e., Bδ3(t)+ Bθ3(t) ≥ Bmin.
If so, the game is completely terminated, and the D2D
acknowledges BSs with current proposals, otherwise, D2D
pair notifies both BSs with requested resources Bmin2 .
TABLE 1. Parameter settings.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the NE of developed game and the system
performance are evaluated through numerical simulations.
The results will show that the sum rate as well as the sum
rate gain of both BSs are improved. Parameter settings for
simulations are listed in Table 1. For simulations, all of the
data presented are calculated by averaging the results from
100 runs, which makes the evaluations more representative
and not heavily affected by stochastic factors.
A. NE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In the first set of experiments, we evaluate NE for three
communication scenarios with different a1 and a2. Fig. 3,
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 display the NE evaluations with the same
constraints 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20, but a1 = a2 = 0.02,
a1 = a2 = 0.05, and a1 = a2 = 0.08, respectively.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 shows the NE evaluation with tighter con-
straints, i.e., 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 15 and 15 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20,
when a1 = a2 = 0.08. In these figures, the subfigures
correspond to the communication scenarios, which are shown
in Fig. 1. For instance, Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b), and Fig. 3(c) are
the NE evaluations for Case 1 (Fig. 1(a)), Case 2 (Fig. 1(b)),
and Case 3 (Fig. 1(c)), respectively. The func1 and func2
represent the best response function of BS1 and BS2, and t is
the game repetition times.
As indicated in Fig. 3, all intersections of best response
function of BS1 and BS2 in Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b), and Fig. 3(c)
meet the constraints 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20, that is, the
intersections fall into the region of 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20. This
indicates that the NE exists in three scenarios. With the game
repeating, BSs eventually allocate Bδ3(tmax) and B
θ
3(tmax)
where tmax = 3, to D2D according to the resource allocation
protocol. Thus D2D pair obtains the maximum resources
Bδ3(tmax) + Bθ3(tmax) for data transmission in three commu-
nication scenarios.
Fig. 4 plots the NE evaluations with larger a1 and a2,
i.e., a1 = a2 = 0.05. Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) provide the
same insights with Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c), therefore D2D
link obtains Bδ3(tmax)+Bθ3(tmax) resources in these two cases.
In the contrary, Fig. 4(a) shows that the NE of the game at
the last stage repetition does not exist as the intersection of
best response function of BS1 and BS2 in the third round is
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FIGURE 3. NE evaluations with a1 = a2 = 0.02. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
FIGURE 4. NE evaluations with a1 = a2 = 0.05. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
FIGURE 5. NE evaluations with a1 = a2 = 0.08. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
located out of the feasible strategy space, which means that
the NE generated by the game may not exist during the game
repetition with a larger adjustment parameter. This matches
the design principle of our game. Thus D2D pair would ulti-
mately receive Bδ3(2)+ Bθ3(2) resources for communication.
Fig. 5 draws the NE evaluation with the largest a1 and a2,
i.e., a1 = a2 = 0.08. Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(c) provide the same
observations compared with Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c), that is,
D2D pair obtain the maximum resources Bδ3(tmax)+Bθ3(tmax)
in these two cases. It is interesting to notice that Fig. 5(a)
only presents the NE data by first two repetitions of the game.
This is because both BSs will no longer play the game if the
NE does not exist in the second stage, and thus the D2D pair
would finally receive Bδ3(1)+ Bθ3(1) resources.
Next we examine the sensitivity of NE to the constraint
as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, which depict the properties
of NE with tighter constraints 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 15 and
15 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20, respectively, when a1 = a2 = 0.08.
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FIGURE 6. NE evaluations with 10 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 15 when a1 = a2 = 0.08. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
FIGURE 7. NE evaluations with 15 ≤ Bδ3 + Bθ3 ≤ 20 when a1 = a2 = 0.08. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
From Fig. 6 we can observe that the NE of the developed
game is sensitive to the constraint. To the first two scenarios
(Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b)), NE does not exist, and thus each
BS would allocate Bmax2 = 7.5 unit resources to the D2D
pair by protocol. Whereas to the third scenario (Fig. 1(c)),
D2D pair receives Bδ3(2) + Bθ3(2) resources. In Fig. 7,
Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) present the same insight with
Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), but Fig. 7(c) shows that the repeti-
tion of game can facilitate the NE to be feasible, which is
consistent with our previous NE analysis as expected.
Based upon above results, we claim that, given the reaction
functions of both BSs, the NE is sensitive to the adjusting
parameters of the game and the system constraint. In practical
scenarios, one possible way for choosing such parameters
is to set a small value and to increase them progressively if
the NE exists. Likewise, for the parameters in the reaction
functions such as x, y, τ, z1, z2, which also impact the perfor-
mance of proposed approach, they can be configured empir-
ically according to the scenarios or statistically by history
communication profile.
B. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to further validate the solutions generated by the
developed game, system performance including sum rate
and sum rate gain of BSs are evaluated in the second set
of experiments. The sum rate of BSs for each scenario are
specified by equations from (1) to (6), while the sum rate gain
is defined as
sum rate gain = R
n
m + RD2D
Rcellular
,
where Rnm is defined by equations from (1) to (6), RD2D is the
sum rate of D2D communications, andRcellular is the sum rate
of cellular communications in the absence of D2D ones.
We consider the above two performance metrics for the
first communication scenario (Fig. 1(a)) under the condition
of a1 = a2 = 0.02 and Bδ3(t) + Bθ3(t) ≤ 20. The com-
parison results of sum rate and sum rate gain are presented
in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively. As can be seen in these two
figures, both of the sum rate and sum rate gain increase
with game iterating, which implies that both BSs have incen-
tive to allocate more resources to the D2D pair for revenue
improvement as long as the sum of their allocations meet
the constraint.With regard to other communication scenarios,
i.e., Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c), we can make similar observations
with Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 if the NE exists in the game. Those
results are skipped due to the space limitation. In summary,
the performance simulations verify that the design of the
repeated game is reasonable, thus enhancing the system per-
formance significantly.
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FIGURE 8. Sum rate comparison for BSs.
FIGURE 9. Sum rate gain comparison of BSs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the resource allocation
problem for intercell D2D communications underlaying cel-
lular network where D2D link is located in the common
area of two neighboring cells. We have presented three
intercell scenarios regarding the resource allocation prob-
lem. A repeated game model under these scenarios has been
developed to address this problem. In the developed game,
the BSs have been characterized as players competing for
resource allocation quota from the D2D demand, and the
utility of each player has been formulated as payoff from both
cellular and D2D communications using resources. Through
the NE derivation and analysis, we have proposed a resource
allocation algorithm, based on which a resource allocation
protocol for BSs has been presented. Numerical results have
verified that the model developed significantly enhances the
system performance and further provides a global insight
into resource allocation for intercell D2D communication
scenarios.
Since our approach is developed under the assumption that
each BS has complete information of another BS, that is, each
BS (player) is assumed to be willing to fully exhibit its private
communication parameters to its competitor and D2D pair,
we plan to, in our future work, extend our model to support
the incomplete information, i.e., each BS only knows the part
of the strategies and payoff parameters of the other BS.
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